



Assimilation Tomorrow

How America's Immigrants Will Integrate by 2030

Dowell Myers and John Pitkin November 2011



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Progress 2050, a project of the Center for American Progress, seeks to lead, broaden, and strengthen the progressive movement by working toward a more inclusive progressive agenda—one that truly reflects our nation's rich ethnic and racial diversity. By 2050 there will be no ethnic majority in our nation and to ensure that the unprecedented growth of communities of color also yields future prosperity, we work to close racial disparities across the board with innovative policies that work for all.

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Introduction and summary

The revival of immigration to the United States since 1970 has been accompanied by substantial social change. Immigration was initially focused in states such as California, Florida, and New York, but it spread across the country beginning in the 1990s.

Many questions remain about the newcomers with such a rise in immigration and new immigrant destinations: Will they learn English? Are they locked in poverty? What are their prospects for success in America? Most importantly, will today's immigrants fully integrate to become tomorrow's Americans?

This report attempts to answer these questions. It examines the future outlook for the nation's immigrants, projecting their gains from today through 2030. Policy options exist to diminish or enhance the integrative trajectories of immigrants. Nevertheless, our projections assume no change—either positive or negative—from the historical patterns of attainment or the historical policy environment.

The report is the second part of a project on immigrant assimilation conducted by the University of Southern California in partnership with the Center for American Progress, with funding support from the MacArthur Foundation. In the first part, “Assimilation Today,” the authors described the process of immigrants' assimilation as it unfolded over the last two decades. In that report we found that immigrants are following the path of their predecessors and assimilating just as rapidly today as they did in the past.

In this report we carry that analysis forward to 2030 to see what immigrant integration will look like in the next few decades. In particular we focus on the cohort of immigrants who arrived in the 1990s—part of the largest wave of immigrants to come to the nation. We further break down the achievements for adult immigrants and their children, and between all immigrants and Hispanic immigrants.

We reached three major findings:

- 1. Immigrants are assimilating into American life, like their predecessors.** They are on track to achieve great successes by 2030. (see Exhibit A)

Most impressive is the fact that the percentage of immigrants who own rather than rent their homes is projected to rise from 25.5 percent in 2000 to 72 percent in 2030. Furthermore, the percent speaking English well or very well is projected to rise from 57.5 percent to 70.3 percent and the percent living in poverty is projected to fall from 22.8 percent to 13.4 percent.

- 2. Hispanic newcomers show very positive rates of advancement by 2030.** (see Exhibit B) This is contrary to assertions of nativist scholars such as Samuel Huntington who argue that Hispanic immigrants are not assimilating by dint of their large numbers and proximity to their home country.¹ Hispanic immigrants' advancements mirror that of all immigrants, albeit from a lower starting point. Their anticipated increase in homeownership is particularly noteworthy, from 21 percent in 2000 to 67 percent in 2030.

- 3. Immigrant youth (age less than 20 on arrival, roughly 20 percent of all immigrants) also show positive gains and dramatic changes between generations.** These changes illustrate just how much an early arrival helps in the integration process.

High school attainment is greatest for immigrants who arrive the earliest. College completion travels along a similar trajectory. Fluent English language acquisition increases even more dramatically for children arriving before the age of 10 compared to teenagers or young adults.

The Great Recession of the late 2000s set back immigrants. But we find that they are surprisingly resilient. Despite the downturn they still ended the decade better off than they were in 2000.

These immigrant advances are substantial and entirely to the benefits of longer settlement and deepening roots in America. Yet such broad gains should not be taken for granted because past rates of immigrant advancement depended at least in part on economic growth and public investments in education and other supports—all of which are now threatened.²

EXHIBIT A All immigrants

Overall progress of the 1990s immigrant wave from 2000 to 2030

	All immigrants	
	2000	2030
Speak English well	57.5%	70.3%
Homeownership	25.5%	71.9%
High school completion	60.8%	74.0%
Four-year college completion	22.6%	31.1%
Naturalization	13.2%	70.6%
Living out of poverty	77.2%	86.6%
Earning better than low income	55.7%	70.3%

Note: Data in 2000 are for adults ages 20 and older; Data in 2030 are a weighted average of projections carried out separately for child-aged arrivals and adults, but with status observed at their ages in 2030.

EXHIBIT B Hispanic immigrants

Overall progress of the 1990s immigrant wave from 2000 to 2030

	Hispanic immigrants	
	2000	2030
Speak English well	36.8%	57.1%
Homeownership	20.9%	66.7%
High school completion	37.6%	56.4%
Four-year college completion	6.7%	12.4%
Naturalization	7.9%	57.2%
Living out of poverty	72.7%	81.6%
Earning better than low income	43.2%	59.0%

Note: Data in 2000 are for adults ages 20 and older; Data in 2030 are a weighted average of projections carried out separately for child-aged arrivals and adults, but with status observed at their ages in 2030.

Why immigrant success is important

We should pay attention to immigrants' future achievement because we will greatly depend on their human resources in coming decades. The coming retirement of the large generation of baby boomers, for example, is expected to create urgent labor needs among private and public employers, and falling labor force growth opens many opportunities for new workers.³

Likewise, immigrants help shore up programs such as Social Security, and losing them would mean a significant shortfall.⁴ The housing market also depends increasingly on immigrant households, who disproportionately own their own homes. Without their buying power homeowners would find it harder to sell their properties.⁵

The coming decade is a pivotal period in the nation's economic history and deserves to be closely monitored. The findings of this study demonstrate how rapidly the new immigrant residents are likely to advance. Their success will be a vitally important contribution to the new economy.

What we as a nation do in the future—whether we pass an immigration reform package that allows all immigrants living in the shadows to become legal and become full and productive members of society or not—will have a great impact on our progress going forward.

This report demonstrates the great potential of immigrant residents. Immigrants do not remain mired in their status as newcomers but surge ahead on many scores. Their progress has been extraordinary and it could become even greater but for the growing number of obstacles placed in the path of many immigrants.

One of the main criteria that should be considered in debates over comprehensive immigration reform is how might we maximize the great potential of our new immigrant residents so that they can contribute even more to our nation.

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Will immigrants integrate?

Long-time residents who live in new destinations for immigrants may worry about the future prospects of newcomers. Will they remain as they are today or advance to greater social and economic achievements as they settle in? As with every group of newcomers—from the Irish in the mid-19th century to Latinos today—questions arise about how and whether they will assimilate to American life.⁶

We know that there are more immigrants living in the United States today than there were 10 or even 20 years ago.⁷ These numbers, along with changes in technology—such as the telephone and the Internet, which make keeping in touch with life in the old country instantaneous—and patterns of settlement make questions about immigrant integration all the more important.

Immigrant settlement in the United States is a gradual process that happens one day at a time, then one year at a time, with progress accumulating over decades. During this process how much do new immigrant residents advance their skills and achievements, such as learning to speak English well, earning a better income, and becoming homeowners? In short, how well are they doing?

The brief answer is that immigrants are integrating into American life, learning English, and becoming homeowners. They on average, will be much better situated by 2030 than when they first arrived.

How this study was conducted

Even with evidence that immigrants are integrating into American life—for example, our 2010 study “Assimilation Today”⁸—doubts still persist about their future: Will tomorrow’s immigrants look like today’s? Will the Great Recession hurt the progress of today’s immigrants?

To separate fact from fiction, we need to track the integration of immigrants over time. Observations of immigrants’ settlement and achievement are a snapshot in

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time or progress from very recent experience. And new arrivals have not resided long enough to show advancement. Only by reaching backward to the progress of previous immigrants can we gain an idea of how much they change after a decade or two.

Each decade's cohort, or wave of immigrants since 1970 will have a different record of achievement. We therefore separately examine the rates of advancement by the cohorts that arrived in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s to determine the differences or similarities for each wave in similar stages of settlement. We then use this information to construct a projection of the future attainments of today's immigrants.

Using available data we can construct several indicators of immigrant achievement, including homeownership, rates of citizenship, and English acquisition.

Simple reliance on current information or political rhetoric is not a reliable base for judgment. Instead, this study provides a credible analysis based on past data and an empirical basis for projecting what immigrant residents' lives will be like after they have been living in the United States for 20 years.

Complicating our analysis, however, is the fact that the nation is struggling to recover from its most severe recession since the Great Depression. Immigrants and native-born residents alike suffered setbacks. We embed the outcomes of the Great Recession in our projections but we assume that there will be an eventual full recovery.

More immigrants are settling in the United States

The number of foreign-born residents in the United States has grown steadily over time. It rose from 9.6 million in 1970 to 31.1 million in 2000.⁹ Today that number stands at 40 million.¹⁰ Not only has the total number of foreign born grown but the average age of this immigrant population also is getting older and longer settled.

Past and future trends of new immigrants

The foreign-born population's social and economic attainments are influenced by past immigration levels and flows of immigrant arrivals in two ways.

First, the new immigrant flows account for the size of today's foreign-born population, and the relative size of new flows of immigrants can shift the proportion of those who arrived recently or who are longer settled. Our previous report, "Assimilation Today," illustrates that longer-settled immigrants score higher on the metrics of assimilation.

Second, we can create a sound empirical basis for projecting future integration by studying how previous immigrants integrated into American life. We see consistent trajectories of assimilation in immigrants who arrived in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Each cohort shows roughly the same progress toward integration after a decade of settlement. This consistent pattern provides us a solid foundation for future projections. (see Appendix A for more information)

Since 1990 net immigration to the United States—or the total number of immigrant arrivals less the number of emigrants—ranged from a low of 800,000 a year in the early 1990s to a peak of 1.2 million by the turn of the millennium. Following 9/11 there was a sharp decline in immigration but the number of net newcomers recovered quickly to almost 1 million per year from 2004 to 2006—a high number but still below the peak of 1.2 million. The three years of the Great Recession show a declining trend with an especially sharp drop in 2009. (see Figure D-1 in the Appendix)

The recent variability of immigrant flows creates uncertainty about how many new arrivals are expected in the future. Our analysis of the available immigration data is summarized in Appendix D. To establish a baseline to predict future immigration, we carried out a Delphi-like projection exercise—where evidence is collected in rounds, using surveys—in April 2011, gathering the expert opinion of 10 leading demographers and economists in the immigration field. Our own opinions were excluded and not revealed.

On average, the experts believe net immigration in the future will rebound from its low point during the Great Recession. But it will not reach the heights previously attained in 2001. By 2015 the experts believe net immigration will be roughly 89 percent of its peak in 2001, or 1.04 million per year, and by 2025, 97 percent of the peak, or 1.15 million per year.

Measuring immigrant advancement

To measure immigration advancement, we compiled data from multiple decennial censuses and the annual supplement to the census known as the American Community Survey, or ACS. These procedures are similar to those we used in our prior report, “Assimilation Today.”¹¹

We use the following six indicators to analyze the census and ACS data: English proficiency, homeownership, education, living above the poverty line, better earnings, and naturalization to citizens. All measure factors that bring gains to the nation as a whole. With the exception of professional occupation, these are the same indicators in our earlier report.¹² In its place, we have added a variable on poverty, as described below:

- **English proficiency**—the percent of the population age 20 and older who self-identify as speaking English either well or very well, or who self-identify as speaking only English. The percentage of immigrants who speak English well increases moderately for the first full decade after arrival but relatively little thereafter. The cohorts examined here arrived in the United States at age 20 or older, so after a decade they are all over age 30 and many are in their 40s or older. Improvements in English proficiency are typically much slower in middle age.
- **Homeownership**—the percent of householders age 20 and older who own rather than rent their homes. The percentage of immigrant households who own their homes increases rapidly and slows only slightly in the second and third decade of U.S. residence. Though the recent housing bubble and crash shook many people’s expectations about the benefits of homeownership, it remains an important goal for most Americans and continues to hold great benefit for the average person. Homeownership is the major vehicle by which people build wealth, and it fosters deeper roots in neighborhoods and communities. Certainly it also imposes liabilities, and those risks must be evaluated more realistically. Yet fostering secure access to homeownership remains desirable for both individuals and for the economy as a whole.
- **Education**—the percent of the population age 20 and older who complete a high school degree or GED equivalent. And, additionally, the percent of the

population age 25 and older who complete a four-year college degree or a more advanced degree. The higher age in the latter adjusts for the fact that most people begin college at a later age than high school.

Completion of high school increases very little among adult immigrants. This lack of change, though, appears to have more to do with differences between how the census and the ACS collect their findings than real differences in achievement.¹³ (see Appendix C) It appears, however, that more recent waves of Latino immigrants have higher rates of high school completion than their predecessors. Immigrants' college completion is slightly more likely to increase in adult years than high school completion, especially for more recent waves of immigrants. This probably stems from immigrants who come to the United States specifically to study.

- **Living above the poverty line**—the percent of the population living in households with income higher than the federally defined poverty line (\$21,954 for a family of four in 2009).

Even in today's sluggish economy, the vast majority of all immigrants (more than 70 percent) live above the poverty line, including Hispanic immigrants. All immigrants made substantial advances out of poverty over two decades, markedly reducing the fraction remaining in poverty. For instance, a gain from 80 percent to 85 percent out of poverty is a 25 percent reduction of those remaining in poverty. The Great Recession clearly slowed or even reversed this upward progress, and Latino immigrants who arrived in the 1990s were among the hardest hit. Nonetheless, by 2009 they were still above their 2000 level and thus projected to increase in the future.

- **Better earnings**—the percent of male earners age 20 to 64 with at least \$100 in earnings per year and whose earnings alone are sufficient to raise a family of four out of poverty.¹⁴ Earnings gains are substantial in the first decade, slowing thereafter, and then decreasing substantially when this population reaches retirement age.
- **Naturalization to citizenship**—the percent of the foreign-born population age 20 and older who became U.S. citizens.

Citizenship rates rise steadily over three decades or more of U.S. residence after an initial period of slow advance. Over time, however, the initial attainments of those who recently arrived appear to be declining from decade to decade, particularly among Latinos. Those who arrived in the years immediately before the

census would not have had time to satisfy waiting periods, so the acceleration of immigration right before the 2000 census depressed the overall citizenship rate for those who arrived in the 1990s. Unauthorized immigrants are not eligible for naturalization, and so a higher proportion of unauthorized immigrants would also depress the rate of naturalization.

We compared cohorts of immigrants that arrived in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s using these indicators. (details shown in Appendix A) Overall, we find remarkable consistency in immigrant advancement across the decades for the different 10-year waves of immigrants (when measured at the same time from settlement, one or two decades later).

Not all indicators advance on the same trajectory, though. Homeownership, for example, generally starts during adulthood while English proficiency and education start much earlier. Other indicators proceed throughout life, such as naturalization.

In some cases change is more rapid, such as homeownership, while in others such as naturalization, change begins slowly—delayed by strict rules around who can apply and when—but then gradually increases.

Nevertheless, the fact that immigrants generally progress on similar trajectories regardless of when they arrive allows us to use the rates of past advancement as a consistent basis for projecting the future integration of immigrant arrivals. (see Appendices C and A for more information on our methodology)

So what does this historical record imply for immigrants who recently arrived?

New immigrants' predicted advancement by 2030

The 1990s immigrants are part of the largest wave of arrivals the nation has ever seen. After 2000 the annual flow began to subside, and it decreased substantially after 2007 due to the Great Recession. Before 2000, however, immigration was rapidly burgeoning, and this group of 1990s arrivals triggered much of the protest about immigration policies. This included concerns over social service usage that led to provisions in 1996 barring most immigrants from receiving them.¹⁵

How well has this group fared, and what further gains can we expect for them based on the pace of advancement of preceding waves?

To shed greater light on these concerns, we also include a separate focus on Hispanic immigrants both because of their large share of all foreign born and because their status is often lower than average for all foreign born.

How the Great Recession affected immigrants

The severe recession officially began in December 2007 and ended in mid-2009 when employment began to grow slowly again, though recovery remains sluggish. This period commonly referred to as the Great Recession caused major disruption to millions of Americans' economic plans. Unemployment rose from 4.6 percent in 2006 and 2007 to 9.3 percent in 2009.¹⁶

We would expect so drastic a disruption to substantially alter the trajectories of advancement among immigrant residents and native born alike. Immigrants were more vulnerable in this economic crisis because of their shorter length of homeownership and lower seniority in the job market. Economic researchers show that immigrants generally fare worse than native born during business cycle downturns.¹⁷

Among immigrants and the native born, we see flatter trajectories that signal blocked progress and even some downturns that indicate decline. (see the detailed trajectories in Appendices A and B) Still, the recession's overall effects are less devastating than expected. Immigrant attainments in all areas in 2009 remain higher than in 2000, though they are down from the boom years at the beginning of the decade.

What we conclude from this comparison to the native born is that while immigrants are more upwardly mobile than their native-born peers, their progress is more vulnerable to economic disruption. Nonetheless, immigrant residents have demonstrated surprising resilience in the face of the Great Recession and remain much better off than they were in 2000.

Projecting the progress of adult immigrants in the 1990s wave

Our projected future progress of the 1990s cohort is shown for all adult immigrants in Figure 1. We find that:

- The proportion living above the poverty line climbs from 77.2 percent to 85.6 percent.
- The proportion of male earners with a better income also grows, rising from 55.7 percent to 69.2 percent, before declining in 2030 when older members of the immigrant wave begin to retire.
- English proficiency and education levels grow only slightly over the decades among these mature adults (but see the analysis of their children that follows).

What is most striking, however, is the dramatic surge in homeownership and citizenship over the decades:

- Homeownership rises nearly 50 percentage points, reaching 73.8 percent of households. In comparison, the nation's overall homeownership rate averaged about 64 percent over the last 30 years.
- Citizenship reaches 70.1 percent of the 1990s wave of immigrants by 2030.

Average attainment levels are somewhat lower for Hispanic immigrants in the 1990s wave, though the rates of advance may be greater since these immigrants generally start at a lower point on the spectrum. (see Figure 2)

- The proportion above the poverty line climbs to 80.8 percent.
- The proportion of male earners with a better income rises from 43.2 percent to a peak of 58.1 percent.

FIGURE 1
Attainment trajectories of all adult immigrants in the 1990s wave





FIGURE 2
Attainment trajectories of Hispanic adult immigrants in the 1990s wave



Other trends are more moderate with the exception of homeownership and naturalization to citizenship.

For Latino immigrants, among the most remarkable findings is their fast pace of advancement into homeownership and toward better earnings, particularly in view of their relative lack of formal education. Hispanic immigrants' homeownership rises to 69.2 percent, exceeding the current national average homeownership rate. Many Latino families become homeowners through steady progress over two or three decades.

Citizenship also climbs steadily to a high of 56 percent. This final projection is constrained by the number of Hispanic immigrants who are ineligible for citizenship due to their current residency status.

Advances by immigrant youth in the 1990s wave

The preceding analysis focused on immigrant adults who were at least 20 years of age when first counted in a U.S. census. Over the subsequent decades they age into older categories. But what about the immigrant children who arrived when they were younger than 20 (roughly 20 percent of all immigrants)? Immigrant children are a rich human resource for the nation and their potential is only unveiled in later decades.

Children change remarkably as they grow into adults, and we also see among immigrants some dramatic changes between generations. Children show more advancement compared to adults on three indicators in particular—high school completion, college completion, and speaking English well. We spotlight these here, comparing the immigrant adults with children who arrived at ages 10 to 19, and even younger, at ages 0 to 9.

The 2030 projections for high school completion are shown in Figure 3. For comparison, the graphs also include the projections for adult immigrants in the 1990s wave (taken from Figure 1). We find:

- Immigrants age 10 to 19 at age of arrival progress from a 73.5 percent high school completion rate in 2009 to an 82 percent completion rate in 2030. Children age 0 to 9 at age of arrival progress from 86 percent in 2020 to 89 percent in 2030.

Immigrant children are a rich human resource for the nation and their potential is only unveiled in later decades.

Hispanic immigrant youth, like their adult counterparts, progress at similar rates to all immigrant youth, albeit from a lower starting point:

- Hispanic immigrant youth age 10 to 19 advance from a 60 percent high school completion rate in 2009 to 68 percent in 2030, while Hispanic immigrant youth age 0 to 9 advance from 77 percent to 81 percent.

For four-year college completion, shown in Figure 4, the relationship between adult and immigrant youth is reversed. This is due to the fact that the adult immigrants are at first advantaged because they include a substantial number who come to the United States specifically for graduate studies and therefore already completed their college degree. This advantage also reflects the fact that substantial numbers of the child immigrants are still in college between the ages of 20 and 29, and thus will not register as completing their degree. By 2030, however, all of the child immigrants are old enough to have completed their bachelor's degree studies.

We see the largest intergenerational differences in projections for speaking English well, shown in Figure 5 (see next page). These differences reflect the pronounced advantage younger immigrants have from an early start at learning a new language.

- The gap between young children and adults is greatest among Hispanic immigrants at 44 percentage points. As these children become adults, they will contribute much stronger English proficiency to the 1990s wave of immigrants.
- Remarkably, all immigrants—as well as Hispanic immigrants who arrive between 0 and 9 years of age—have English proficiency rates above 90 percent by 2030.

FIGURE 3
High school attainment of immigrants who arrived in the 1990s wave, by their age at arrival, projected to 2030





FIGURE 4
Four-year college attainment of immigrants who arrived in the 1990s wave, by their age at arrival, projected to 2030



A portrait of the 1990s cohort in 2030

In sum, what will today's new immigrants look like in the future? How much will they change the longer they live in the United States?

We project marked achievements for this group (Exhibit C) despite the setbacks of the Great Recession, which impeded or even reversed certain attainments they made during the latter 2000s. With the nation's anticipated recovery from the recession, however, immigrants' advances are expected to resume at rates common in prior decades, though years were lost and ultimate attainments will be somewhat lower than otherwise might have been achieved.

Over the course of 30 years, by 2030, immigrants become much better English speakers. Among all immigrants, the percentage speaking English well—or very well, or only English—advances to 70.3 percent, and among Hispanic immigrants this reaches 57.1 percent, a majority. Their college completion is also expected to reach a higher level, with Hispanics doubling their frequency.

The most notable gains are in homeownership, the vaunted American Dream. Among all immigrants, homeownership rises from 25.5 percent to 71.9 percent over the 30-year period. Similarly, among Hispanic immigrants, we also expect to see a large increase, rising from 20.9 percent to 66.7 percent. As extraordinary as these gains may seem, they are consistent with the track records of earlier immigrants.

FIGURE 5
Percent of immigrants speaking English well who arrived in the 1990s wave, by their age at arrival, projected to 2030




EXHIBIT C

Overall progress of the 1990s wave of immigrants

Initial 2000 attainments and projected 2030 attainments, all observed at ages 20 and older

	All immigrants		Hispanic Immigrants	
	2000	2030	2000	2030
Speak English well	57.5%	70.3%	36.8%	57.1%
Homeownership	25.5%	71.9%	20.9%	66.7%
High school completion	60.8%	74.0%	37.6%	56.4%
Four-year college completion	22.6%	31.1%	6.7%	12.4%
Naturalization	13.2%	70.6%	7.9%	57.2%
Living out of poverty	77.2%	86.6%	72.7%	81.6%
Earning better than low income	55.7%	70.3%	43.2%	59.0%

Note: Data in 2000 are for adults ages 20 and older; Data in 2030 are a weighted average of projections carried out separately for child-aged arrivals and adults, but with status observed at their ages in 2030.

Conclusions

Increasing numbers of foreign born are settling in America. Likewise, the characteristics of America are changing, and by 2050 America is projected to have no single racial or ethnic majority. Having a clear picture of immigrant advancement will be all the more pressing in the future with a greater number of foreign-born residents.

What we find is that immigrants' upward trajectories are remarkably consistent across the decades. Far from a life in poverty, immigrants are exemplifying the American Dream. Based on this conclusion, the 1990s arrivals can be projected.

By 2030 the majority of these immigrants will be speaking English well (70.3 percent of all immigrants, 57.1 percent of Hispanic immigrants). A great majority will be homeowners (72 percent of all immigrants, 66.7 percent of Hispanic immigrants). And the vast majority will be living outside of poverty (86.6 percent of all immigrants, 81.6 percent of Hispanic immigrants).

But even these positive outcomes could be made more positive if we changed our laws to allow all current immigrants to become fully part of American life through a tough but fair process of earned legalization. Permitting immigrants without status to come out of the shadows will make it easier for them to assimilate and integrate, and help them achieve better educational and economic success. On the other hand, new restrictions on immigrants' ability to work and live might impede the attainment rates of them and their children beyond what we have observed in the past.

This report is a call to invest more resources into immigrant integration. While our immigrants are becoming Americans, they do it often in spite of, rather than because of, the resources put forth for integration efforts. Creating more programs for immigrant education, English language training, and antipoverty efforts will reap future dividends.

Contrary to the critics, immigrants *are* integrating into American life, and doing so in impressive ways. Hopefully future policymakers will take the gains immigrants have made into account and encourage them even further.

What we find is that immigrants' upward trajectories are remarkably consistent across the decades. Far from a life in poverty, immigrants are exemplifying the American Dream.

Appendix A: Historical trajectories of recent immigrant advancement

To gauge the historical trajectories of recent immigrants, each indicator of immigrant status attainment (English proficiency, homeownership, education, living above the poverty line, better earnings, and naturalization to citizens) is observed in 1980, 1990, 2000, 2006, and 2009.¹⁸ The latter is the most recent year for which data are currently available.

We chose to include both 2006 and 2009 data to incorporate the disruption posed by the Great Recession. We therefore separately identify the trends from 2000 to 2006 (at the peak of the boom), and then from 2006 to 2009 (at the bottom of the recession), in addition to the overall decade trend from 2000 to 2009.

Four separate arrival cohorts, also termed waves of immigrants, are examined across these time points. These cohorts include arrivals in the following decades:

- Arrivals in the 1970s, first observed in the 1980 census
- Arrivals in the 1980s, first observed in the 1990 census
- Arrivals in the 1990s, first observed in the 2000 census
- Arrivals in the 2000s, first observed in 2006, and then again in 2009

The advancing status of each arrival cohort is traced across the decades. Each cohort is initially defined as all people age 20 and older, and its age range shifts to follow the advancing ages of its members.

As an example, the 1980s cohort of arrivals is first observed at age 20 and older in 1990, followed by age 30 and older in 2000 and age 39 and older in 2009. A similar procedure is required to capture the emergence of immigrant children when they arrive at adulthood a decade or two after their arrival, as presented later.

Advancement by immigrant adults to the present day

We examine the advancement of all immigrants, and Hispanic immigrants separately, showing these as a pair of plots for each indicator in Figure A-1.

FIGURE A-1
Recent historical trajectories of advancing achievement
by cohorts of immigrants that arrived in different decades





FIGURE A-1 (CONTINUED)
Recent historical trajectories of advancing achievement
 by cohorts of immigrants that arrived in different decades



Three points to consider:

First, when the trajectory of advancement is steeper, it indicates a more rapid pace of advancement. That pace is often most rapid in the first decade or two of U.S. residence, slowing thereafter.

Second, different indicators change rapidly at different stages of life—some in the first decades of adult residence (homeownership, income), some mainly at young ages (English proficiency and education), and some throughout life (naturalization).

Third, there is a remarkable consistency in the rates of advancement observed across decades for different waves of immigrants when observed at the same stage of settlement (duration since arrival). Only during the Great Recession is there evidence of disruption in the regularity of immigrant progress, and that is limited to homeownership, earnings, and poverty.

One striking observation about Latino immigrants is their remarkable pace of advancement into homeownership and toward better earnings, particularly in view of their relative lack of formal education. Many Latino families become homeowners through hard work and steady progress over two or three decades.

Comparisons to native-born citizens, reported in Appendix B, show that immigrants achieved more rapid upward progress, albeit from a lower starting point, than the native-born during the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s.

Among the Latino immigrants who arrived in the 1980s, the share that earned a better income rose from 39 percent to 64 percent in its first complete decade (ending in 2000). The 1990s arrival wave was on track for similar gains until the Great Recession caused a loss of some of their earlier gains in earnings. The share with a better income fell from 60 percent to 54 percent in 2009, which was still well above their 2000 share of 43 percent.

The entry of immigrant youth into adulthood

Three indicators in particular show differing advancement between the parents' and children's generations—high school completion, college completion, and speaking English well. We spotlight these here, comparing the immigrant adults with children that arrived at ages 10 to 19, and even younger, at ages 0 to 9.

The differences in educational attainment as measured in 2009 are shown in Figure A-2. High school completion is markedly higher for immigrant children who arrived at younger ages, and these advantages are even greater for Hispanic immigrants.

Whereas only 48 percent of immigrants in their 20s are high school graduates, 60 percent of immigrants who arrived at ages 10 to 19, and 77 percent of those arriving before age 10, completed high school. The youngest group is even approaching the completion rates of native-born Hispanics (83 percent).

The pattern of improvement over generations is similar for Hispanic immigrants completing college, and in fact the youngest arrivals have a slightly higher completion rate than the native born (9.2 percent versus 7.9 percent). The youngest arrivals among all immigrants also have higher college completion than their respective native-born counterparts (21 percent versus 15 percent).

FIGURE A-2
Percent with high school or four-year college degree, 2009





FIGURE A-3
Percent speaking English well, 2009




Among all immigrants, however, we also can see that arrivals in their 20s are highly likely to be college graduates, possibly because they migrated at this age in order to obtain a graduate education in the United States (after which point many return to their home country).

The findings regarding age and speaking English well are even more dramatic. (see Figure A-3 above) More than 90 percent of the youngest arrivals report speaking English well, including among Hispanics and all immigrants. This compares to lower percentages of adult Hispanic immigrants who speak English well (36 percent) or of all immigrants in their 20s (58 percent). By comparison, a comprehensive study of all census variables found that English proficiency is the most sensitive to differences in age at arrival.¹⁹ Educational attainment was found to be the second-most influenced by a young age at arrival.

Appendix B: Native-born trajectories on economic indicators

The Great Recession of the post-2006 period affected native-born residents as well as immigrants. Comparable data for native-born citizens, reported in Figure B-1, shows that the native born achieved less rapid upward progress, albeit from a much higher starting point, than immigrants during the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. The steeper upward trajectories of immigrants were blunted by the onset of the recession but a very similar pattern was recorded among the native born.

FIGURE B-1
Comparing economic trajectories for native born
 ages 20-39 at first observation, in percent



Appendix C: Methodology for attainment rate projection

How immigrant achievement grows with duration in the United States

Advancement among adults is tracked according to an immigrant's growing length of residence in the United States. In 1970 the decennial census used a new question asking what year the individual came to live in the United States, and a similar question is asked in the series of American Community Surveys fielded since 2006.

These questions on year of arrival allow us to identify waves of immigrants in each successive census and survey as their members grow longer settled. A sizable literature drawing on these data has accumulated in the social sciences about the pace of immigrant assimilation.²⁰

We can observe a variety of different social and economic outcomes using these data. Recent studies show how the pace of immigrant advancement differs substantially when measured on different indicators.²¹ Given this variability, it is unwise to describe immigrants' progress by a single outcome. The most credible approach is to present the range of indicators that is available in the census or its supplement, the American Community Survey.²²

Complexities in the projection model

The core assumption in this paper is that past paces of immigrant advancement suggest the likely future pace for immigrants passing through a similar settlement stage.

The rate at which new immigrants learn English in their first decade of U.S. residence in the future, for example, will presumably resemble that in the past for prior new arrivals. And the rate at which this pace of advancement tapers off in the second decade of residence is assumed to be similar in the future to the tapering

off in the second decade for previous waves of immigrants. The reasonableness of these assumptions is underscored by the strong consistencies of experience for successive waves of immigrants, as will be discussed later.

There are two sets of complications in the 2000s analysis.

The first is that we must use the new American Community Survey instead of the census, because the census no longer asks questions about nativity or socioeconomic status. For the most part the questions asked in the ACS are similar in content to those in the census, but the survey procedure yields results slightly higher on high school education completion and slightly lower on English proficient.²³

The ACS's timing is also different from the census. Rather than collect the data with a reference date of April 1 of the census year, the ACS is collected continuously over the entire year, with some answers about current status or "12 months ago" reported with respect to January, some to July, and some to December.

On average the responses are calibrated to July 1 (the midpoint) but the 2009 ACS falls nine months before the April 2010 census. For our purposes we have calculated immigrants' pace of advancement through the entire decade of 2000 to 2009, treating the ACS observation as if it fell on April 1, 2010.²⁴

The second set of complications stems from the treatment of the Great Recession's effects. Immigrant advancement was stalled or reversed on certain economic indicators after 2006. This is the one major inconsistency in the regularity of immigrant advancement over the last four decades. The question is how to factor this interval into our expectations for future advancement.

We believe this recession effect is well accommodated by the general method we adopt. In essence, we use the progress of past cohorts to model the expected progress of today's children as they mature into adulthood. We combine the advancement paces observed in different decades to yield an average expected rate of future advancement. The projected rates of advancement going forward from 2009 are set equal to the mean rate observed for the three earlier cohorts at the corresponding stage since arrival in the United States for adults age 20 or older in the periods 1980 to 1990, 1990 to 2000, and 2000 to 2009.²⁵

Outline of the method for projecting attainments

Projections to 2030 are carried out in two temporal steps. We will use the homeownership rate as an example.

For homeownership, the ownership rate of the 1990s immigrant wave was observed to be 50.5 percent in 2009, the starting point for the projections shown in Figure A-1.

In the first temporal step, between 2009 and 2020, the cohort is projected to advance at a rate equal to the average of (a) the 1980s wave between 2000 and 2009, (b) the 1970s wave between 1990 and 2000, and (c) the 1960s wave between 1980 and 1990.

Then, in the second temporal step, from 2020 to 2030, the 1990s wave's ownership rate is projected to advance at the average rate of (a) the 1970s wave from 2000 to 2009, (b) the 1960s wave from 1990 to 2000, and (c) the 1950s wave from 1980 to 1990.

These rates of advance are applied to the latest observation for the immigrant cohort, in this case a 2009 starting point, and then to the projected result from the first temporal step.²⁶ The impacts of the Great Recession carry forward into the future because of the 2009 starting points of the projections, which are lower than in 2006, and also because the slow advances of the 2000s decade are averaged into the future rates of advance.

Attainments of child immigrants in the 1990s are projected separately from adult immigrants by following a parallel method. Future attainments for those who arrived at age 10 to 19 are projected forward from 2009, when they were observed at age 19 to 28.

Their rates of advance are set equal to the average advances of cohorts in three earlier waves who arrived in the same age range: For 2010 to 2020, these cohorts are 1960s arrivals during the 1980s, 1970s arrivals during the 1990s, and 1980s arrivals during the 2000s, and for 2020 to 2030 the comparable cohorts are 1950s arrivals during the 1980s, 1960s arrivals during the 1990s, and 1970s arrivals during the 2000s.

For those who arrived before age 10, the same procedure is used. But the initial projection is for 2020, when the cohort will be age 20 to 29. This starting point for the projection is set equal to the observed 2009 attainment of the previous cohort who arrived before age 10—those who were age 19 to 28 in 2009 and who arrived during the 1980s.

Appendix D: Methodology for population projection

Population projections for immigrants

Immigrants go through the same changes as the rest of the population after they arrive: They grow older, experience fertility and mortality, and also potentially emigrate out of the United States. An accurate population projection model must incorporate all these effects and play out their logical implications for the foreign-born population's future status. The primary benefit of a population model is to provide a more richly detailed profile of the evolving foreign-born population—not simply to produce a different population total.

The population projections used in this report take into account immigrant generations and foreign-born duration in the United States in addition to age, sex, and race. The current projections in this report are the latest in a series that has been under development for more than 15 years.²⁷ The projections are fully reported in “Projections of the U.S. Population, 2010-2030 by Immigrant Generation and Foreign-Born Duration in the U.S.” with a summary of methods and underlying assumptions presented here.²⁸

The base for the 2011 edition of our projection series is the 2000 census population (100 percent) counts by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin, integrated with nativity (place of birth) and foreign-born year of entry based on the 2000 census (5 percent PUMS); and native-born generation based on 2000 Current Population Survey estimates.

The 2000 census has two critical advantages. Data in the necessary detail were available at the time of modeling, in early 2011, and they include the needed nativity and year of entry characteristics.

Population data from the 2010 census with age-sex-race characteristics have since become available. But these more current data are insufficient for our purposes

because the 2010 census failed to collect information on nativity and year of entry. As a result, the 2000 census retains an advantage over the 2010 census that may prove enduring.²⁹

As described next, we have updated this earlier, more detailed population to accord with the 2010 census counts through a demographic simulation that adds births, subtracts deaths, and accounts for migration.

Components of population change, 2000-2010

Births are taken from 2000-2009 U.S. Vital Statistics annual data, with detail by mother's race, origin, age, and nativity through 2008. The best evidence is that birth records are complete and accurate.

Deaths are from 2000-2009 U.S. Vital Statistics annual data, with detail by decedent's age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. These records have also been found to be complete and accurate. Deaths are apportioned among nativity, years of entry, and generations in proportion to population.³⁰

Annual emigration is estimated based on modeled rates that vary by nativity. Foreign-born emigration rates are fixed, with variation by age, sex, origin, and years since arrival in the United States. We use rates estimated by a residual method between the 1980 and 1990 censuses by Bashir Ahmed and J. Gregory Robinson in a 1994 paper.³¹

Annual immigration is first estimated from the 2001-2009 ACS estimates of the number of foreign-born residents in each year who lived abroad one year ago. These annual estimates are then adjusted up so the modeled population, summed from all factors, matches 2010 census total population targets. Since the 2000-2009 birth and death data are thought to be nearly complete, the assumption is that any differences between the modeled and census populations are due to errors in the estimates of immigration. It must be noted that this inference assumes that net coverage of the population in the 2010 census was approximately the same as in the 2000 census.³²

The 2010 census benchmark

The 2010 population estimate derived from the foregoing components matches the total census population. The estimates for each age, race, and Hispanic origin group are then ratio-adjusted to match the corresponding 2010 census (SF1) population. The resulting populations for birth cohorts age 10 and older are then used as the 2010 base for our projections going forward. For cohorts born after the 2000 census, the pre-adjustment populations—based on reported births plus immigration minus deaths—serve as the base population for the projections going forward.³³

Components assumptions, 2010-2030

Births are projected by applying age, race, origin, and nativity-specific birth rates to the projected population of women of childbearing age. The rates assumed in future years are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) projection middle series schedules. Differences between rates for native- and foreign-born women of the same race and Hispanic origin are calibrated to U.S. Vital Statistics reported births for 2000-2008 and held constant in future years.

Deaths are projected by applying age, race, and origin-specific mortality rates to the projected population. The rates assumed in future years are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) projection middle series schedules. The same rates are applied to the native- and foreign-born population.

Emigration is estimated based on per capita rates that vary by nativity, duration since entry, age, sex, race, and origin, as described above.

Immigration is projected based on the results of our Delphi-style survey of immigration experts regarding total immigration flows anticipated in 2015 and 2025, 1.04 million and 1.15 million, respectively. (see Figure D-1) The total number of immigrants in each year through 2025 is interpolated between the estimated 2009 immigration of 790,000 and these two estimates. Thereafter it is held constant. The shares of all immigrants from different countries of origin are based on the origins of 2000-2009 immigrants and held constant.³⁴


The total U.S. population of 391.1 million projected for 2040 would imply a 30-year average annual increase of 2.74 million from 2010, the same as the

increase measured over the past 30 years from 1980 to 2010.³⁵ This average annual increase is 440,000 less than the Census Bureau’s 2008 estimate, and 390,000 below 2008 projection of Passel and Cohn for the same span.³⁶ Almost all of the difference is accounted for by reduced levels of future immigration in our projection.

One of the most important factors in immigrant achievement, as will be shown, is the length of time that immigrants have lived in the United States. Figure D-2 breaks down the foreign-born population by length of U.S. residence, showing the percentage of the total who lived in the United States less than 10 years, 10 to 19 years, or 20 years or more.


In 2000 the share of newcomers—people who have been here less than 10 years—within the immigrant population was 43 percent. By 2030 this share is expected to decline to 27 percent. Conversely, the share comprised of long-settled immigrants with 20 or more years of residence is expected to grow from 30 percent in 2000 to 53 percent in 2030.

FIGURE D-1
Annual net immigration to United States, 1990-2009, 2009-2030



Source of estimate: 2001-2009 Census Bureau vintage 2009, 1990-2000 from Passel and Suro (2005) gross – prorated emigration at 21.5 percent, Pitkin and Myers, Survey of Expert Opinion.

FIGURE D-2
Foreign-born population by time since arrival, 1990-2030



About the authors

Dowell Myers, a demographer and urban planner, is a professor in the USC School of Policy, Planning, and Development where he is director of the Population Dynamics Research Group. Myers has authored numerous studies of the temporal dynamics of immigrant advancement and integration and is author of the books *Analysis with Local Census Data* and *Immigrants and Boomers*.

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Endnotes

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- 2 Aaron Terrazas, "The Economic Integration of Immigrants in the United States: Long- and Short-Term Perspectives" (Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2011).
- 3 Dowell Myers, *Immigrants and Boomers: Forging a New Social Contract for the Future of America* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007).
- 4 Hung-Ju Chen and I-Hsiang Fan, "Migration, Social Security, and Economic Growth, unpublished, 2011, available at <http://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30251/>; Kjetil Storesletten, "Sustaining Fiscal Policy Through Immigration" (Stockholm, Institute for International Economic Studies, 1999), available at <http://folk.uio.no/kjstore/papers/sfpti.pdf>.
- 5 Dowell Myers, "Thinking Ahead About Our Immigrant Future: New Trends and Mutual Benefits in Our Aging Society" (Washington: Immigration Policy Center, 2008); Giovanni Peri, "Immigration and Cities," *VoxEU*, 2007, available at <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/734>; Rakesh Kochhar, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, and Daniel Dockterman, "Through Boom and Bust: Minorities, Immigrants, and Homeownership" (Washington: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009); Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, "The State of the Nation's Housing" (2010).
- 6 See, for example: Tyler Anbinder, *Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Known Nothings and the Politics of the 1850s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Huntington, *Who Are We?*
- 7 Between 2000 and 2010, the nation is estimated to have received 10.3 million new immigrant arrivals, and the total foreign-born population expanded to an estimated 12.9 percent to 13.2 percent of the nation's population. The most recent American Community Survey (2010) reported 12.9 percent foreign born; however, the California Demographic Futures, or CDF, model controlled to the 2010 census counts suggests that his share could be as high as 13.2 percent. The absence of immigration data from the 2010 census, unlike past censuses, now requires reliance on surveys and analytical estimates.
- 8 Dowell Myers and John Pitkin, "Assimilation Today: New Evidence Shows the Latest Immigrants to America Are Following in Our History's Footsteps" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2010).
- 9 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States, 1850-2000." Working Paper 81 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).
- 10 American Community Survey, "Selected Characteristics of the Native and Foreign-Born Populations, 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates," available at: http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_10_1YR_S0501&prodType=table
- 11 The latter is fielded monthly for a complete sample of the resident population in the United States. This survey replaces the detailed socioeconomic questions formerly asked in the decennial census and is designed to yield survey estimates that are consistent with those from the censuses. For more information about the ACS and our assessment of its consistency with the decennial census, please see the Methodology section in our previous report, "Assimilation Today."
- 12 Occupation is a difficult variable to include, because there are hundreds of individual codes for different occupations. The occupation variable we previously analyzed was categorized to represent "professional" occupations. This was overly broad and tracked closely with possession of a B.A. degree, so little was added to the assimilation analysis. Accordingly, we elected to omit this variable from analysis.
- 13 The upswing from 2000 to 2006, as previously mentioned, stems from the switch from decennial census to American Community Survey measurements. The upswing occurs in all waves of immigrants and therefore does not appear to represent a real change in status achievement. From 2006 to 2009 there is a subsequent small downturn in status achievement among all immigrant waves. It is not certain if this is another slight change in the measurement post-2006. The major competing explanation would be that better educated immigrants are emigrating, returning to their home countries or elsewhere, because they can take better advantage of their higher education during the Great Recession outside the United States. This outmigration is far more likely to occur, however, among immigrants from more recent waves who are not firmly settled. In fact, we see evidence that the downturn occurs equally for immigrants settled since the 1970s and 1980s as for arrivals in the 1990s and 2000s. That suggests a change in survey measurement that is broad based.
- 14 We use earnings of \$100 as a baseline, to separate out people who earn no money, and thus can show no change over time. Separately we have calculated earnings for women, with similar results, but we focus on men because they have been the longtime bellwether studied by labor economists.
- 15 The cohort of arrivals in the 2000s will undoubtedly be the most affected by factors such as the economic downturn. Still, it is too early to make robust projections for this group, and instead we have chosen to focus on the 1990s cohort, the largest group of immigrants, and also one for which we have ample data.
- 16 That figure has only dropped to 9.1 percent by September 2011. Data from: "Unemployment Rate," available at <http://data.bls.gov>.
- 17 In addition to our assessment that immigrants lack the resources, contacts, and networks of support enjoyed by the native born who are much longer resident, Orrenius and Zavodny suggest a few other explanations for immigrant vulnerability to downturn, emphasizing that most immigrants have less education and lower skills, and that those groups are hit hardest by downturn. (In fact, in the current downturn, low-skilled immigrants were heavily concentrated in construction, which suffered the greatest collapse.) Orrenius and Zavodny point out, however, that college-educated immigrants also suffered more than their native-born peers, consistent with our interpretation of greater resources and network support among the native born due to their longer residence and deeper networks. See: Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny, "Tied to the Business Cycle: How Immigrants Fare in Good and Bad Economic Times" (Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2009).
- 18 In general, we find that measurements taken from the four different censuses or surveys are in fact very consistently defined. Two exceptions that were identified in "Assimilation Today" pertain to measurement of high school completion and English proficiency in the American Community Survey. Relative to the previous census benchmarks, high school completion appears to be higher by a few percentage points, while speaking English well appears to be lower by a few percentage points. The discontinuity was discussed in "Assimilation Today," p. 17 and 31-32, and is visible in Figures 2, 3, and 5 of that report. As before, we have not adjusted for these discontinuities but call attention to them where relevant. Myers and Pitkin, "Assimilation Today."
- 19 Dowell Myers, Xin Gao, and Amon Emeka, "The Gradient of Immigrant Age-at-Arrival Effects on Socioeconomic Outcomes in the U.S.," *International Migration Review* 43 (1) (2009): 205-229.
- 20 See, for example: George Borjas, "Assimilation, Changes in Cohort Quality, and the Earnings of Immigrants," *Journal of Labor Economics* 3 (4) (1985): 463-489; Dowell Myers and Seong Woo Lee, "Immigrant Trajectories into Homeownership: A Temporal Analysis of Residential Assimilation," *International Migration Review* 32 (3) (1998): 593-625; John Pitkin and Dowell Myers, "A Summary Period of Measure of Immigrant Advancement in the U.S.," *Demographic Research* 24 (12) (2011): 257-292.

- 21 Jacob L. Vigdor, "Measuring Immigrant Assimilation in the United States: Second Edition" (New York: Manhattan Institute, 2009); Michael J. White and Jennifer E. Glick, *Achieving Anew: How New Immigrants Do in American Schools, Jobs, and Neighborhoods* (New York: Russell Sage, 2009); Myers and Pitkin, "Assimilation Today"; Pitkin and Myers, "A Summary Period Measure."
- 22 In a change from prior censuses, the 2010 census collected information from only a handful of questions about basic demographics. The social and economic questions, such as income and place of birth, are asked now in the American Community Survey. Either the 2009 survey that precedes the census or the 2010 survey that follows provide vital information to supplement the census count.
- 23 For details, see the Appendix to "Assimilation Today," our earlier report through the Center for American Progress.
- 24 We assume that the 2009 observation reflects the end of the decade, even though it is nine months shy of the April 2010 census date. In effect this introduces the implicit assumption that no further advancement occurs by that date, consistent with the reasoning that the lingering recession will forestall resumption of expected gains.
- 25 Only the latter two decades of advance are computed into the average rate of advance for naturalization, because the decade of the 1980s shows implausible declines among child immigrants.
- 26 The projected rates of advance are calculated as proportional reductions in the hazard of not attaining the more advanced status. This functional form constrains the projected rates to be less than 100 percent and is used for example in: Pitkin and Myers, "A Summary Period Measure."
- 27 John Pitkin and Patrick Simmons, "The Foreign-Born Population to 2010: A Prospective Analysis by Country of Birth, Age, and Duration in the U.S.," *Journal of Housing Research* 7 (1996); Dowell Myers and John Pitkin, "Demographic Futures for California" (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 2001); Dowell Myers, John Pitkin, and Julie Park, "California Demographic Futures: Projections to 2030, by Immigrant Generations, Nativity, and Time of Arrival in U.S., Full Report" (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 2005).
- 28 John Pitkin and Dowell Myers, "Projections of the U.S. Population, 2010-2040, by Immigrant Generations and Length of U.S. Residence for the Foreign Born." (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 2011), available at: <http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/futures>.
- 29 The American Community Survey is intended to replace the sample census data that were collected in 2000. The 2010 ACS will be the first that is controlled to 2010 Census counts and in principle might provide the information required to create a base population that is independent of the 2000 Census. Sample sizes for small population groups will be an issue and concerns about the coverage of the foreign-born population will first need to be addressed.
- 30 Mortality rates are assumed the same for all nativity groups of a given age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin.
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- 32 Evidence on the validity of this assumption will only become available with the Census Bureau's release of survey-based estimates of census population coverage. These results are expected to be released in early 2012.
- 33 The observed ratios between 2010 census and births-based population estimates are applied to the population under age 10 reported in the projection years. This procedure preserves the differences between recorded births and census populations under age 10 that were observed in 2010 and earlier censuses. A similar "inflation-deflation" method was used in earlier Census Bureau projections to account for differences in coverage rates between age groups. Similar differences were observed in the 2000 Census by John Pitkin and Julie Park, "The Gap Between Births and Census Counts of Children Born in California: Undercount or Transnational Movement?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Philadelphia, 2005.
- 34 This is taken from ACS estimates of birthplace of foreign-born persons who lived abroad one year ago. Age and sex are assigned to immigrants from each origin in the same proportions as recent immigrants in the 2000 census.
- 35 Pitkin and Myers, "Projections of the U.S. Population."
- 36 Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, "U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050" (Washington: Pew Hispanic Center, 2005).

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